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ABSTRACT
Licensed Shared Access (LSA) is a new shared spectrum access
model that is gaining traction for unlocking incumbent spectrum to
mobile network operators in a form similar to licensed spectrum,
thus having the potential to alleviate the spectrum crunch below
6 GHz. Short-term spectrum auctions can pave the way for dy-
namic LSA in the future and to create incentives for incumbents
to voluntarily participate in the LSA model, thereby increase spec-
trum availability. Different from existing auction schemes that are
mostly based on the sealed-bid auction format, we consider an as-
cending bid format which is theoretically equivalent to a sealed bid
format but comes with better behavioral properties. We develop a
novel auction mechanism called GAVEL that follows the ascend-
ing bid auction format and is well-suited for the dynamic LSA
context. GAVEL, besides being strategy-proof, satisfies the three
additional desirable properties of supporting heterogeneous spec-
trum, fine-grained spectrum sharing and bidder privacy protection.
In fact, GAVEL is the first mechanism to satisfy all these prop-
erties. Through simulation-based evaluations, GAVEL is shown to
outperform two recently proposed schemes in terms of revenue, so-
cial welfare, number of winners and achieving high spectrum uti-
lization while at the same time performing close to the LP based
optimal solution.
CCS Concepts
•Networks → Cognitive radios; Network resources allocation;
Network economics; •Theory of computation→ Computational
pricing and auctions;
Keywords
Network Economics; Spectrum Auction; Ascending Bid Auction;
Licensed Shared Access; Privacy Preserving Auction
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile data traffic has been experiencing dramatic growth in the
past several years and this growth trend is expected to continue for
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the foreseeable future. Making more spectrum available is an ob-
vious mechanism to cope with this growing demand. However op-
portunities for clearing spectrum below 6 GHz, where most mobile
networks operate currently and will continue to do so in the future,
to create new bands for licensed exclusive use by mobile network
operators (MNOs) are dwindling. However MNOs prefer licensed
spectrum as it offers interference protection and lets them develop
services that provide guaranteed quality of service (QoS).
In this context, Licensed Shared Access (LSA) [21] has emerged
as a new shared spectrum access model that can unlock substantial
amount of licensed spectrum below 6 GHz held by incumbents not
concerned with civilian wireless and mobile data communication
and enable more efficient use of such spectrum bands. LSA frame-
work allows incumbents to authorize other users (e.g., MNOs) to
access all or part of the spectrum licensed to them at designated
times and in designated geographical regions as per the sharing
rules agreed between them and mediated by the national regula-
tor. From a MNO perspective, LSA model opens up new spectrum
bands for use that are qualitatively similar to licensed spectrum to
offer guaranteed QoS. While the current LSA use cases reflect rel-
atively longer term authorization of incumbent spectrum to LSA
licensees in the order of a few years, it is believed that we will
be heading to a future with a dynamic LSA model that features
short-term and fine-grained spectrum sharing [24], and potentially
involving new operators and business models [3]. Moreover, the
current LSA frameworks lack incentives for incumbents to volun-
tarily open up the spectrum they hold for sharing.
Dynamic spectrum auctions [12] can help address the aforemen-
tioned issues with potential LSA spectrum. In general, auctions are
an effective market mechanism due to their perceived fairness and
efficiency in allocating resources. All the bidders have equal oppor-
tunity to win and the resources are sold to bidders who value them
the most. In the LSA context, auctions have two main advantages:
(i) they allow dynamic allocation of spectrum for short time periods
and also even sharing at a fine-grained channel level as opposed to
the static allocation of chunks of spectrum over long periods usu-
ally spanning years; (ii) they create incentives for the incumbents to
participate in the auction, leading to more spectrum availability in
the market. When used to coordinate spectrum sharing among LSA
licensees, a suitable auction mechanism should be able to support
heterogeneous spectrum bands and channels as the LSA spectrum
as a whole is expected to be fragmented across different parts of
the spectrum with widely different propagation characteristics.
The auction format used can have a significant impact on the
effectiveness of the auction scheme [1, 7]. Auctions have been ex-
tensively used over the years for dynamic spectrum management
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Figure 1: LSA Framework Illustrated.
with several different types of strategy-proof auction mechanisms
developed to suit different scenarios [32]. However, almost all are
based on the sealed-bid auction format, where the auctioneer col-
lects bids from the bidders for all the channels simultaneously to
compute winners and market clearing prices. Our key insight is
that limitations of existing auction schemes can be attributed to the
underlying auction format. So we depart from the convention and
consider for the first time the ascending bid auction format, which
is theoretically equivalent to a sealed-bid auction, but offers better
behavioral properties that help overcome the limitations of sealed-
bid auctions (lack of support for heterogeneous channels, privacy
protection and false-name bids). We elaborate on this point in Sec-
tions 2.2–4.
Our goal in this paper is to design a short-term spectrum auction
mechanism based on the ascending bid auction format, that is well
suited for the dynamic LSA context. Such a mechanism should
handle heterogeneous spectrum and also support fine-grained spec-
trum sharing, as mentioned above. It should also be strategy-proof
to be robust to threats from insincere bidders by guaranteeing that
the best strategy for a bidder is to bid truthfully based on its pri-
vate valuations. However, this does not protect the bidders from
the threats of an insincere auctioneer [25]. Bids based on true val-
uations may reveal the bidders’s utility, which would act as a dis-
incentive for bidders to bid truthfully and may impose the need for
bidding strategies. This suggests privacy protection of the bidders
as an additional requirement. Privacy protecting auction mecha-
nisms [10, 11, 19, 23, 37] that protect the bid privacy mostly use or-
der preserving cryptographic tools (such as the Pallimer cryptosys-
tem) while lacking in other desirable properties like heterogeneous
spectrum support.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
2.1 Licensed Shared Access (LSA) and Desir-
able Auction Features
Licensed Shared Access (LSA) [21] is a new shared spectrum
access framework that allows one or more LSA licensees to access
the spectrum that has already been allocated to an incumbent. This
framework has been designed to serve the short-term to mid-term
needs through a quasi-static allocation of shared spectrum to LSA
licensees. Each licensees conform to certain sharing rules included
in their rights to use the spectrum. During the period when the
license is active, the incumbent forfeits the spectrum access right
to the LSA licensees who can guarantee a certain QoS since the
resources are now assured.
The LSA framework consists of four main entities, the incum-
bents, LSA repository, LSA controller and the LSA licensees shown
in Fig. 1. The incumbent is the spectrum owner with long term li-
censes for exclusive access to a spectrum band (e.g., 2.3GHz band
in Europe). Incumbents propose sharing agreements that could
define temporal, geographical, and power level constraints, so as
to protect themselves from interference. The LSA repository is a
database which receives from the incumbents the pieces of spec-
trum in terms of space, time and frequency that are available for
sharing along with the conditions they are subject to. The LSA
Controller is responsible for managing access to the shared spec-
trum that has been made available to the LSA licensees based on the
sharing rules and incumbent usage provided by the LSA repository.
While the LSA framework has a broader scope, where each LSA
controller can interface with more than one LSA repository as well
as with multiple LSA licensee networks that use different technolo-
gies, we focus on a simpler and concrete scenario where there exists
one LSA controller per licensee (a MNO). LTE-Advanced (LTE-A)
supports carrier aggregation and can aggregate spectrum across dif-
ferent bands. It is conceivable that LTE can use carrier aggregation
to leverage the spectrum available under LSA.
In the following, we outline aspects important to consider when
designing a short-term auction scheme for the dynamic LSA con-
text.
Spectrum Heterogeneity: Regulatory authorities across differ-
ent countries are moving towards releasing spectrum under the LSA
model. In Europe, the 2.3-2.4 band is being considered for use un-
der LSA [21]. This band is currently used by cordless cameras,
telemetry, and defence systems across Europe. Apart from these
two, 3.6-4.2 GHz [15] and 4.8-4.9 GHz, respectively used by satel-
lite earth stations and radar systems, are other potential bands that
could be made accessible on a shared basis via LSA. It is well
known that transmissions across different frequency bands may
have different propagation and penetration characteristics. These
different characteristics are useful in serving different use cases
(e.g., low frequency bands for coverage, high frequency bands for
capacity and small cells). The auction mechanism should be able
to support bidding for different types of spectrum.
Fine-grained Channels: Sharing spectrum at a fine-grained level
in time and space promotes efficient spectrum use. An LSA li-
censee’s spectrum needs can be bursty. With LSA, the size of the
spectrum band being sold in the market may still be too big for
users who only need intermittent but guaranteed access to the spec-
trum. The use of fine-grained channels allow users the ability to
acquire the resources it requires but at a lower cost. The availabil-
ity of fine-grained channels significantly increases the accessibil-
ity of such spectrum to more users since the amount of spectrum
available in the market is limited. This in turn increases the social
welfare in the market as more number of bidders’ demand can now
be satisfied. A side effect of this is the increase in competition, re-
sulting in higher revenue for the incumbents, in turn incentivizing
the incumbents to release more spectrum in the market.
Privacy Protection: The LSA repository, which may play the
role of the auctioneer, could be from a third party vendor in which
case the bid information should be protected from it. There are two
main threats due to an insincere auctioneer in the LSA context: (i)
overcharging winners; (ii) collusion with insincere bidders.
Overcharging: A common pricing scheme is the second pric-
ing, where the auction winner with the highest bid pays the second
highest bid (or the highest losing bid). If the bid information of the
Table 1: GAVEL compared with existing auction schemes
Auction Scheme Auction Format Strategy-proof Hetero Spectrum Fine Grained Channels Privacy Protection
VERITAS [35] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 7
PROMISE [30] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 7
TRUST [36] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 7
ADAPTIVE [18] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 7
ALETHEIA [26] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 7
PPer [19] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 3
DEAR [37] Sealed Bid 7 7 7 3
PPS [10] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 3
SPRING [11] Sealed Bid 3 7 7 3
SATYA [17] Sealed Bid 3 7 3 7
KAS [16] Sealed Bid 3 7 3 7
SMASHER-GR [33] Sealed Bid 3 3 3 7
∏ [33] Sealed Bid 3 3 7 7
TAMES [5] Sealed Bid 3 3 7 7
LOTUS [4] Sealed Bid 3 3 7 7
TAHES [9] Sealed Bid 3 3 7 7
AEGIS-MP [34] English Clock 3 3 7 7
GAVEL (This Paper) Ascending Bid 3 3 3 3
winner is available to an insincere auctioneer, it enables the auc-
tioneer to create a fictional second price bid to maximize its own
profit.
Collusion with insincere bidders: An insincere auctioneer who is
colluding with an untruthful bidder, may reveal the winning bid to
the untruthful bidder, who may then bid much higher then its own
valuation to force the winner to pay more.
2.2 Limitations of Existing Auction Schemes
Existing schemes do not satisfy all the properties that are of in-
terest to enable spectrum sharing in a dynamic LSA context. Since
the first truthful short-term spectrum auction [35] was proposed, is-
sues such as heterogeneous channels, privacy protection and false-
name bids have been uncovered. Some of these issues have been
addressed in subsequent works [5, 6, 9, 33, 34, 36] but with increas-
ingly complex adaptations to the auction scheme.
Most of the existing auctions for the short-term spectrum mar-
ket are based on the sealed bid auction format. We now discuss
them with respect to support for the desirable properties outlined
in the previous subsection: heterogeneous spectrum, fine-grained
channels and privacy protection.
Heterogeneous Spectrum: When the market has heterogeneous
spectrum, it leads to additional design challenges in the auction
mechanism. Bidders would have different valuations for different
types of spectrum and may need to submit a different bid for these
different bands of spectrum, hence the need for bid diversity. Ex-
isting auction schemes [8,35,36] mostly treat spectrum as identical
objects and apply the same conflict graph for different spectrum
while considering spectrum reuse. Some recent works [5, 9, 33, 34]
have considered spectrum heterogeneity with increasingly complex
winner and price determination schemes. However these mecha-
nisms do not protect the bid information from the auctioneer and
also do not support fine-grained channel sharing. Lastly, Zheng et
al [33] proposed SMASHER-GR that supports heterogeneous spec-
trum as well as fine-grained channels. However it is limited due to
uniform valuations where a bidder must have the same uniform val-
uation for all channel bundles (combinations) he desires irrespec-
tive of the number/types of channels in each bundle. In addition,
SMASHER-GR does not provide privacy protection from a rogue
auctioneer.
With sealed bid auction format, the market clearing price deter-
mination involves identifying the critical neighbor for each channel
a bidder wins. The critical neighbor is the bidder with the highest
losing bid. The difficulty in providing support for heterogeneous
spectrum is primarily due to the additional complexity in identify-
ing the critical neighbor to determine the opportunity cost for each
channel independently. There are multiple conflict graphs, one per
channel, and hence each bidder may have a different set of interfer-
ing neighbors for each channel.
Fine-grained Channels: Most existing auction schemes pre-
clude shared use among interfering users and the allocations ensure
no interference between winners. The auction scheme proposed by
Kasbekar et al. [16] can be adapted to enable shared use among
neighbors. However, they do not support heterogeneous channels
and their approach becomes intractable due to the lack of a bid-
ding language. Kash et al. [17] propose SATYA, a truthful auction
scheme for spectrum sharing that uses bucketing and ironing of bids
to maintain monotonicity for truthfulness. While this is the first
scheme to support channel sharing, it has a few drawbacks. Firstly,
it does not support bid diversity and heterogeneous spectrum. Sec-
ondly, it has an exponential run time and is only polynomial under
some restrictions.
As with the heterogeneous spectrum, supporting fine-grained chan-
nels using sealed-bid auctions requires complex price and winner
determination strategy. This is again due to the additional com-
plexity in identifying a critical neighbor when multiple interfering
bidders can win the same channel. Satya [17], for example, uses
a complex scheme involving bucketing and ironing of bids to de-
termine winners which enables fine-grained channels, but lacks in
support for other desirable properties such as heterogeneous chan-
nels.
Privacy Protection: An insincere auctioneer can leverage the
bid information to its own advantage [23]. Recently, a few auction
schemes [10,11,19,28,37] that provide bid privacy have been pro-
posed for dynamic spectrum allocation. Huang et al. [10] propose
PPS, a strategy proof auction scheme that protects bid informa-
tion from the auctioneer using Paillier’s cryptosystem. However,
it lacks in several necessary properties such as bid diversity and
support for heterogeneous channels. Huang et al. [11] proposed
SPRING, a strategy-proof auction scheme that uses asymmetric
key encryption to protect the bid information from the auctioneer.
However, a bidder can bid for only one channel, which severely
limits its use. Ming et al. [19] propose PPER, an auction scheme
that guarantees bid privacy and economic-robustness using the re-
verse simplex method that enables the LP problem to be solved in a
distributed fashion. However, the scheme assumes that all channels
are homogeneous. Zhu et al. [37] proposed DEAR, which protects
the bid privacy with the use of cryptography tools. It is a single
price auction where all the winners are expected to pay the same
price. In sealed bid auction schemes, the auctioneer receives the
bids from all the bidders and is the only entity in the auction to
have all the information. This information bias can be avoided by
encrypting the bids from the auctioneers. However, encrypting the
bid information from the auctioneer also leads to the limitations in
these privacy protecting auction schemes as discussed above.
Table 1 qualitatively compares the proposed auction mechanism,
GAVEL and its preliminary version [20], with existing schemes in
terms of truthfulness and satisfying the above mentioned proper-
ties.
2.3 Related Literature
Market mechanisms [14, 31] that have been proposed for re-
source management in wireless networks can be adopted for winner
and price determination of short term spectrum auctions. However
they encounter the same problems as that of a sealed bid auction
when applied to short term spectrum access, as a critical neighbor
must still be identified for price determination to guarantee truth-
fulness. As a side note, an auction mechanism can be modeled as
a special case of matching with contracts [27] to compute winners
and prices. However, existing matching algorithms cannot be ap-
plied to dynamic spectrum allocation due to the lack of support for
characteristics such as spatial reuse and heterogeneous spectrum.
Several game theory based approaches [13, 29] have been pro-
posed for wireless spectrum management. They can be adopted to
determine winners and prices for short term spectrum access. How-
ever, they are still based on the sealed bid auction format and create
an information bias between the auctioneer and the bidders. Hence
these approaches share the same limitations as sealed bid auction
schemes.
2.4 Other Key Considerations
Rich Bidding Language: The availability of heterogeneous chan-
nels in the market, provides the bidders access to a set of substitute
and complementary channels with interdependent values. It is es-
sential that the bidders are provided with a rich bidding language
to bid for the right set of substitute and complementary channels.
For example, in the simplest case, let us assume that a bidder has
two substitute channels C1 and C2 available at its location. If the
bidder wins C1 channel then its valuation for C2 would drop and it
should be able to decrease the bid for C2 reactively. Similarly, if
the bidder has two complementary channels C3 and C4 available at
its location, and wins channel C3 then the valuation for channel C4
would not change. The bidding language of the auction mechanism
should therefore provide bidders the ability to express their prefer-
ences on the right combination of substitute and complementary
channels.
The fundamental problem is that the existing auction mecha-
nisms support either substitutes or complementary channels in the
market but not both. Auction mechanisms for homogeneous spec-
trum [19, 26, 30, 35] assume all channels in the market are substi-
tutes, while auctions for heterogeneous spectrum [4, 5, 9] assume
all channels are complementary. However in a dynamic LSA con-
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Figure 2: Illustration of sealed-bid auction format.
text, the market for heterogeneous spectrum would consist of both
substitutes and complementary channels. For example, channels
in the 3.6-4.2 GHz band could be considered substitutes, where as
channels in 3.6-4.2GHz are considered complementary to channels
in the 2.3-2.4 GHz band.
This problem is common to sealed bid auctions where the bid-
ders express their bids for all the channels simultaneously without
being able to express bundle preferences. While this is not a prob-
lem for combinatorial auction schemes such as [33, 34], it would
require a complex winner and price determination strategy, not to
mention the overhead for bidders in computing bids for all such
possible combination of channels.
Protect from False-name bids: False-name bids [26] is a cheat-
ing technique where a bidder submits multiple bids for the same
item by creating multiple fictitious bidders in the market. This can
increase the utility for the rogue bidder at the cost of the auction-
eer and other bidders. As discussed in [26], this can lead to a se-
vere loss in revenue for the auctioneer when a number of bidders
cheat using false-name bids. In this cheating technique, a rogue
bidder exploits the auctioneer’s need to identify the critical neigh-
bor for winner and clearing price determination. By creating a fic-
titious bidder in the neighborhood the bidder can manipulate this
critical neighbor determination process and hence this vulnerabil-
ity is common to all the sealed-bid short-term auctions. To pre-
vent the manipulation of the critical neighbor identification process,
ALETHIA uses a modified winner and price determination strategy
but that cannot be used for heterogeneous spectrum. Moreover, it
does not support bid diversity, privacy protection and fine-grained
channels.
2.5 Choice of the Auction Format
The foregoing discussion suggests that limitations of existing
auction schemes from the requirements for dynamic LSA context
can be linked to the sealed-bid auction format they use. Indeed the
choice of the auction format is a key decision in auction design.
The sealed bid and ascending bid [22] auctions are two different
auction formats that can both identify the minimum Walrasian equi-
librium prices and enable truthful bidding. In contrast to the sealed
bid auction format (see Fig. 2), in the ascending bid auction frame-
work, shown in Fig.4, the bidders (through a proxy agent) gradually
submit their demand set to the auctioneer at increasing prices over
multiple rounds until all the demands are met. Hence the outcome
is incrementally computed in each round. While they have theo-
retically equivalent outcomes, their behavioral differences in terms
of information bias and critical neighbor identification, as shown in
Fig.3, influence the effectiveness of the auction schemes in prac-
tice [1, 7].
Information Bias: The information exchanged among the bid-
ders and the auctioneer play a critical role in the effectiveness of the
auction. In the sealed bid auction format, the bid information is not
Information Bias
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Rich Bidding 
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Behavioral
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Figure 3: Behavioral differences between sealed-bid and
ascending-bid auction formats and associated issues.
shared among the bidders. The auctioneer is the only entity with
access to all the bids. This information bias leads to two problems.
First, lack of bid privacy protection: the auction is now vulnerable
to an insincere auctioneer who could create a false second highest
bid to increase its revenue at the cost of the winning bidder. Sec-
ond, enough information is not shared during the auction process
to enable bidders to react to price changes or for market price dis-
covery.
Whereas in the ascending bid format, the right amount of infor-
mation is shared during the auction process. The demand set can be
inferred by all the bidders during the auction process with increas-
ing prices and the auction for an item ends at the market clearing
price. This protects against an insincere auctioneer since the auc-
tioneer does not have access to the highest bid as the auction ends at
the second highest price. The information from the demand set can
enable the bidders to react to price changes and for market price
discovery. Ascending bid auctions also have the additional advan-
tage of being transparent which can positively influence the bidding
behavior while simplifying the bidding strategy.
Critical Neighbor Identification: In sealed bid auction frame-
work, the winner and price determination involves identifying a
unique critical neighbor for each winner and channel in such a man-
ner that the auction mechanism is strategy proof. This process gets
increasingly complex with additional constraints such as support
for heterogeneous channels, bid diversity, and fine-grained chan-
nels.
In ascending bid auctions, there is no need to identify a criti-
cal neighbor since the price at which the demands can be met is
the market clearing price. Hence, the complexity of winner and
price determination algorithm does not increase with additional
constraints. For the same reason, the auction mechanism also pro-
tects against cheating techniques such as false name bids.
Considering these behavioral differences between sealed-bid and
ascending-bid auction formats, we conclude that the latter is better
suited for the dynamic LSA context.
3. SYSTEM MODEL
We model the LSA framework as a spectrum market with the aim
of enabling dynamic fine-grained sharing of heterogeneous spec-
trum via short-term auctions. Auctioneer could be the same entity
that manages the LSA repository. Each LSA licensee (MNO) in-
teracts with the repository via its LSA controller as shown in Fig.
1. Each MNO could have multiple bidders participating in the auc-
tion at any given time with each such bidder representing demand
for a certain type of spectrum at a particular location. We con-
sider the spectrum to be heterogeneous and the bidders preference
to be diverse. Let N= {1,2, . . .N} be the set of bidders competing
for heterogeneous channels denoted by C = {C1,C2, . . .Cm} and
|C|= m.
Conflict graphs are commonly used to represent reuse constraints
in spectrum auctions. Conflict graph can be used to represent the
constraints posed by the sharing agreement accepted by a bidder of
the LSA licensee, including frequency, spatial and temporal con-
ditions. More specifically, each bidder1 appears as a node in a
conflict graph. Each channel has a conflict graph represented as
GCk = (VCk ,ECk ) where each user i is associated with a vertex
i ∈ VCk and edge ε = (i, j) ∈ ECk exists if users i and j can con-
flict (interfere) with each other when they use channel Ck. Let N
Ck
i
represent all the neighbors of bidder i, i.e., all the vertices VCk in
conflict graph GCk such that there exists an edge ECk with bidder i.
Each bidder i ∈ N has valuations VCki → R over channels Ck ∈
C, which are considered private values. The consumption set for
bidder i is denoted using Xi, where bidder i’s consumption bundle
is given by xi = {xC1i ,xC2i , . . .xCMi } ∈ Xi, with 0≤ xCki ≤ 1 denoting
the fraction of channelCk consumed by bidder i. The clearing price
vector for bidder i is denoted byWi = {wC1i ,wC2i , . . .wCmi } ∈R. The
utility for bidder i with the consumption bundle xi can be computed
as :
Ui(xi) = ∑
Ck∈C
(VCki −WCki )xCki
The existence vector Ei = (e
C1
i ,e
C2
i , . . .e
Cm
i ) is used to denote
whether a channel is available for use for bidder i. The alloca-
tion vector ACk = (a
Ck
1 ,a
Ck
2 , . . .a
Ck
N ) where 0 ≤ aCki ≤ 1, is used to
denote the proportion of channel Ck that has been allocated to bid-
der i. When bidder i is allocated exclusive use of channel Ck, the
allocation vector aCki = 1 and when its not allocated a
Ck
i = 0.
A Proxy Agent is used to bid on behalf of the bidders in order
to control the level of interaction the bidders have with the auction-
eer. The bidders express their demand curves (demand as a func-
tion of round price) to a proxy bidding agent, who then responds
to the auctioneer with the appropriate demand values at the round
price. The proxy agent can perform this bidding with the demand
curves received during the beginning of the auction and the bidder
has the ability to adjust the demand curves in response to higher
prices. The frequency of these adjustments determine the level of
bidders’ interaction with the auctioneer during the auction process.
The demand curves are generated by the bidders during the auction
process, using functions that may depend on different parameters
such as utility and budget. These functions are independent to the
auction mechanism and can be bidder specific.
4. GAVEL
In this section, we develop GAVEL, a strategy-proof auction mech-
anism that is fundamentally different from the existing auctions
schemes. Specifically, it is an ascending bid auction for short-term
and fine-grained spectrum sharing, suitable for dynamic LSA con-
text.
4.1 Overview
The basis for GAVEL is the ascending-bid auction mechanism
proposed by Ausubel [2] that is shown to be efficient and also repli-
cates the outcome of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction. But
Ausubel’s mechanism is not intended for dynamic spectrum shar-
1The terms bidder and user are used interchangeably henceforth.
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Figure 4: Schematic of the system architecture with GAVEL.
ing. As such, it does not account for any of the unique characteris-
tics associated with the dynamic spectrum allocation in general and
the LSA model in particular. Spatial reuse, which allows multiple
users to be allocated to the same channel provided they do not in-
terfere with each other, is one such characteristic. Heterogeneous
spectrum discussed in Section 2 is another characteristic. Fine-
grained channel sharing among interfering neighbors is yet another
characteristic that needs to be accounted.
A
B
C
D
E
A: C1, C2, C3
A: C1, C2 A: C2, C3
V: 13, 8, 6 V: 4, 16, 8
V: 6, 18
V: 12, 10
V: 14, 12
A: C1, C2, C3 A: C2, C3
Figure 5: Auction Example: Graph showing conflict between
five bidders with the channels available for use (A:) and private
values of those channels (V:)
Fig. 4 shows the overall architecture of the system based on
GAVEL. The timeline for the system in operation is seen as a se-
quence of epochs, each consisting of a short Auction Phase fol-
lowed by a much longer Spectrum Use Phase. The duration of an
epoch could be a few minutes to several hours depending on the
use case. Each Auction Phase consists of one or more rounds in-
volving interaction between the auctioneer (LSA Repository) and
bidders (could be multiple per LSA Licensee) as part of the auc-
tion to meet the spectrum demand of the bidders subject to their
valuations, spectrum availability and mutual conflicts. The bidders
interaction with the auctioneer can be managed using a proxy agent
as described in Section 3. At the beginning of Auction Phase, the
auctioneer announces the initial price, i.e., the reserve price. It then
waits for a bidding period to receive demands from the bidders at
that price. Depending on the demands, the auctioneer may allocate
one or more channels to some of the bidders at the current round
price. The auction then may proceed to another round by increasing
the reserve price to bring down excess demand. This process may
continue over several rounds until there there is no more demand to
be fulfilled. At the end of the auction phase, bidders whose bids are
successful, proceed to use the spectrum they won in the following
Spectrum Use Phase subject to the sharing conditions, until the end
of that epoch. This process repeats in the next epoch and so on.
4.2 Detailed Description
We now describe GAVEL in more detail. Referring to Fig. 4, at
the beginning of an epoch (round t = 1), the auctioneer announces
a reserve price vector p1 = (p
C1
1 , p
C2
1 , . . . , p
Cm
1 ) for the channels, and
the bidders respond with the demand vectorDi(1)= (d
C1
i (1),d
C2
i (1),
. . . ,dCmi (1)) where 0 < d
Ck
i (1) ≤ eCki is the portion of channel Ck
that bidder i desires at price pC11 from what is available for use
(eCki ). If a bidder desires exclusive use of a channel then its demand
would be 1. The round price controls the demand from each bidder
in the sense that the decision to bid for a channel is determined by
the number of channels within its private valuations. Only the chan-
nels that have higher valuations than the current round price would
be in demand from the bidder. This channel has to be available for
the bidder to use which is determined by the LSA Controller with
information from the LSA Repository. The demands are assumed
to be weakly decreasing with increasing price:
∀i ∈ N, ∀Ck ∈ C ∀t ≥ 1 dCki (t) ∈ {0,dCki (1)} (1)
At each round t with price vector pt , for channel Ck ∈ C, the
auctioneer determines if for any bidder i the aggregate demand of i
and its neighbors in the conflict graph GCk is low enough to satisfy
i’s demand. If so, dCki (t), the portion of channel Ck demanded by
bidder i, is credited to the bidder.
aCki =
d
Ck
i , if ∑
j∈Ni∪i
dCkj (t)≤ 1.
0, otherwise.
(2)
Appropriately, the current round price pCkt for channelCk is added
toWCki , the total price to be paid by the bidder at the end of the auc-
tion.
The above process repeats with increasing round prices until
there is no demand from the bidders. The channels won by the
bidders are now assigned to them and removed from their list of
available spectrum. In order to prevent the neighbors from rebid-
ding for the channels that they cannot use (because one of its neigh-
bors already won the channel), we remove these channels from the
neighbors availability list as well. All the bidders that won channel
Ck are no longer treated as active players in the auction scheme for
channel Ck. The round price is now reset to the spectrum reserve
price and the multi-round auction process is repeated until there is
no demand for channels at the reserve price.
Note that to allow for spatial reuse, we view only the neighbors
of a node in the conflict graph as its competing bidders. For exam-
ple in the conflict graph shown in Fig. 5 A competes with B and
C in the auction; C competes with A, B and D; and E competes
only with D. This is unlike the classical VCG auction or Ausubel’s
mechanism where all bidders compete with each other.
4.3 Example
We now illustrate the working of the GAVEL auction mechanism
for the example in Fig. 5. For simplicity we assume the bidders
demand for channels are independent, i.e. their demand for one
channel does not influence their demand for another. To observe
the progress of the auction, we set the proxy agent to interact with
the bidder in each round to provide updated demand curves. Note
that in Fig. 5(a), the set of channels available at each bidder with
“A:”. As a specific example, bidder A has three channels available
(1, 2 and 3). A fraction of the channel is assigned to a bidder only
if the LSA controller identifies if its available for use to the bidder.
Table 2: GAVEL Illustration: Price and Demand Vector over different rounds
Round Price Vector A B C D E Action
1 (1,1,1) (0.6,1,0.5) (0.3,0.4,0) (1,0.4,0.2) (0,0.2,1) (0,1,0.5) Ch 3 credited to A
2 (4,6,3) (0.6,1,0.5) (0.3,0.4,0) (0,0.4,0.2) (0,0,1) (0,1,0.5) Ch 1 to A and B, Ch 2 to E
3 (4,8,8) (0.6,0,0) (0.3,0.4,0) (0,0.4,0) (0,0,1) (0,1,0.5) Ch 2 credited to bidders B and C
4 (4,8,10) (0.6,0,0) (0.3,0.4,0) (0,0.4,0) (0,0,1) (0,1,0) Ch 3 credited to bidder D
In this particular scenario, the demand is high with all the bidders
desiring for (a fraction of) every channel available to them. The
price vector announced by the auctioneer at different rounds and
demand vector of bidders at different rounds in the auction scheme
are shown in Table 2. The demand vector of bidders shown at round
1, are the fractions of channels required by the bidders.
In the first round of the auction with price p1 = (1,1,1), the
auctioneer sets a reserve price of 1 for channels 1, 2, and 3. The
five bidders A, B, C, D, and E bid for fractions of channels based on
their demand (as they have higher valuations than the current round
price). For instance, bidder A has a demand of 60% of channel C1,
exclusive use of channel C2 and 50% of channel C3. Note that at
bidder A,
∑
j∈NA∪A
dC3j (p1) = d
C3
A +d
C3
B +d
C3
C = 0.7 < 1,
so bidder A is credited with channel 3. Since there is excess
demand, the auction proceeds to subsequent rounds with the price
getting incremented at each round. At price vector p= (4,6,3), at
bidder E,
∑
j∈NE∪E
dC2j (p2) = d
C2
E +d
C2
D = 1≤ 1.
Since the cumulative demand from E’s neighbors show no com-
petition, i.e., at this point in the auction, E is guaranteed to win
channel 2. Similarly, bidder C does not have demand for channelC1
anymore, so bidders A and B win channel 1 to be shared between
them at 60% and 30% respectively. At price vector p = (4,8,8),
bidder A loses interest in channelC2, and bidder C has no more de-
mand forC3. So, B and C are credited channel 2 at price 8. Finally,
at p = (4,8,10), the market clears with bidder A winning chan-
nels C1 and C3, bidder B winning C1 and C2, bidders C, D, and E
winning channels C2, C3 and C2 respectively.
It can be clearly seen from the above example that the result of
the auction is efficient: the auction has allocated the channels to
the bidders who value them the most. The formal proof is provided
in section 4.4. It can also be seen that the resultant pricing for
channels won is equivalent to that of a VCG auction. For example,
bidder A wins channelC3 at the reserve price and channelC1 at the
opportunity cost (pC1 = 4) of bidder C which is the highest losing
bid. Similarly, bidder B wins C2 channel at the highest losing bid
(p= 8) amongst its neighbors and so on.
Complexity. GAVEL runs in O(NMR), where, N, M and R are the
number of bidders, number of channels, and the number of rounds
respectively. In one auction round, the neighborhood demand is
checked for each bidder and for each channel to enable the chan-
nel credit process (NM). With R rounds, GAVEL has a computa-
tional complexity of O(NMR) and hence runs in polynomial time.
In practice, the values of both M and R are also quite small, further
supporting the applicability of GAVEL in an online scenario.
4.4 GAVEL Properties
Theorem 4.1. GAVEL is individually rational.
Input: ∀Ck ∈ C GCk , ECk , Price Vector P
Output: ∀i ∈ N Channel allocation Ai
and Price to be paid Wi
t← 1
while True do
D(t)← GetDemandsFromBidders(P(t))
for i ∈ N do
for (Ck ∈ C) do
if ∑
j∈Ni∪i
dCkj (t)≤ 1 then
If channel Ck is newly allocated in this round
then it is credited to bidder i and the price is
adjusted
if aCki = 0 then
aCki ← dCki (t) ;WCki ← pCki (t)
end
end
end
if (∀i ∈ N Di(t) = 0) then
if (t = 1) then
Exit Auction
end
if (t > 1) then
Debit aCki from existence vector E of winning
bidders and their neighbors i, for all channels
Ck ∈ C
t← 1
end
end
t← t+1
end
end
Algorithm 1: GAVEL Auction Scheme
∀i ∈ N Ui(xi)≥ 0
Proof. If bidder i wins channel Ck at round t with price p
Ck
t , then
it means it has positive demand at round t for channel Ck, i.e.,
dCki (t)> 0 which means p
Ck
t <V
Ck
i .
Therefore, GAVEL is individually rational for all bidders.
Theorem 4.2. GAVEL is truthful. The dominant strategy for a bid-
der is to bid truthfully.
Proof. : In order to prove that an auction mechanism is truthful, we
need to show: (i) the pricing function does not depend on the bid
of the winning bidder; and (ii) it is monotonic, i.e. if bidder i wins
a channel at bid p then he will win the channel at any bid p∗ > p.
It is indeed the case that pricing function in GAVEL does not
depend on the bid of the winning bidder. In any given round, the
price that i needs to pay for the channels it is credited in round t is
the round price pt , which does not have any relation with i’s bid.
Now to the monotonicity. Assume bidder i wins a channel at
price pt at round t and at any of its subsequent rounds t∗> t, the cu-
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Figure 6: Performance of various metrics with increasing demand
mulative demand of i’s neighbors ∑
j∈N−i
dCkj (t)≥ ∑
j∈N−i
dCkj (t∗). The
only way bidder i cannot win the channel at higher price p∗ is if
the aggregate demand of i’s neighbors increases with the bid p∗.
This is not possible since we have assumed that the demand vec-
tors are weakly decreasing with higher round prices, which results
in a monotonically non-increasing demand for each channel with
each new round. Thus i will always win the channel at any bid
p∗ > p.
Therefore, GAVEL is a truthful mechanism.
Remark. With the properties of individual rationality and truth-
fulness, and given GAVEL is a multi-unit single auction scheme
implies that it is also economically robust.
Theorem 4.3. GAVEL protects against the frauds of an insincere
auctioneer.
Proof. : The auction should be able to protect the bidder from the
auctioneer overcharging winners and colluding with other greedy
bidders.
Overcharging Winners: In order to overcharge the winners the
auctioneer must have the knowledge of the winning bidder’s valu-
ation. In GAVEL, bidders never have to reveal its demand curve
beyond the winning price: A bidder i who wins channel Ck with
valuation VCki at price w
Ck
i < V
Ck
i stops bidding at w
Ck
i and hence
the valuation VCki is never revealed to the auctioneer.
Collusion with greedy bidders: For this trick to work, the greedy
bidder must bid above its own valuation but less than the winning
bidder’s valuation in order to make a profit. In GAVEL, it is im-
possible for the greedy bidder to do this without risking winning
the channel at a price higher than its valuation, as the winning bid-
der’s valuation is never revealed. In which case the greedy bidder
will suffer a negative utility and the auctioneer will lose revenue
from the sale of that channel, as the bidder is now unable to pay.
Therefore GAVEL protects against the frauds of an insincere auc-
tioneer.
Theorem 4.4. GAVEL protects against false-name bids.
Proof. : To show that GAVEL protects against false-name bids, we
need to show that a bidder cannot increase his utility with false-
name bids, given that the other bidders and their bids remain the
same.
This is a proof by contradiction. Suppose bidder i wins x frac-
tion of channel Ck at price pt and with a fictitious bidder i′ it wins
x′ fraction of channel Ck where x 6= x′. In GAVEL, x fraction of
channelCk can be won by bidder i at price pt if and only if at round
t, ∑
j∈Ni
dCkj (t) ≤ 1− x. With a fictitious bidder, if it wins x′ fraction
of channel Ck then it means ∑
j∈Ni′
dCkj (t) ≤ 1− x′. Since i and i′
has the same set of neighbors (Ni = Ni′ ) , this can only happen if
the demand from the neighbors change, which is a contradiction.
Therefore GAVEL protects against false-name bids.
5. EVALUATION
For our evaluation, we follow the auctioning based LSA frame-
work described in section 1 with the LSA controller as the auc-
tioneer and the LSA licensees with non-zero demand as bidders.
The bidders act as their own proxy agent with access to channel
valuations. We compare the results obtained with different auc-
tion mechanisms. Specifically, we compare GAVEL against two
recently proposed truthful combinatorial auction schemes, AEGIS-
MP [34] and SMASHER-GR [33], which supports heterogeneous
spectrum. AEGIS-MP is based on the English Clock auction for-
mat in which losing bidders are allowed to increase their bids or
shrink their bundles until the auction ends. It uses a greedy mech-
anism for channel allocation and identifies critical neighbors to en-
able truthful bidding. However, it does not support fine-grained
channels. SMASHER-GR is a sealed bid auction that uses the
notion of virtual channels to supports fine-grained channels. The
bidders are expected to have uniform valuations for any channel
bundles they are interested in. Note that both these scheme do not
provide bid privacy protection.
To model an urban environment, we consider an area with a re-
alistic distribution of about 2000 houses per square kilometer. We
set the number of channels in the market to 20 and to simulate het-
erogeneous spectrum in the market, we divide these channels into
three bands, 700 MHz, 2.4 GHz and 3.5 GHz with 80m, 30m, and
10m interference range respectively. For each of these three bands,
the average number of neighbors within the interference range is
about 20, 12 and 6 respectively.
Methodology: The auction schemes take as input the (i) con-
flict graph for each channel in the market (ii) the valuation of chan-
nels for all bidders and (iii) the price vector. For AEGIS-MP the
demand from bidders are only for exclusive channel use, since they
do not support fine-grained channels. We adapt demand in the mar-
ket by changing the bidders’ channel valuations. For SMASHER-
GR we use uniform valuations for all channel bundles. We rerun
these auction schemes 10 times for increasing demand in the mar-
ket. The demand in the market signifies the fraction of channels
the bidders have positive valuations for. For example, at 20% de-
mand, on an average the bidders have positive valuations for about
20% of the channels available for use at their location. We evaluate
the performance of GAVEL on the following metrics while varying
demand in the market: (i) Revenue; (ii) Social Welfare; (iii) Spec-
trum Utilization and (iv) Percentage of Winners . To benchmark
auction mechanisms with the optimum, we use the following LP
formulations that maximize each of these four metrics individually.
Social Welfare :max
a ∑i∈N ∑Ck∈C
VCki a
Ck
i (3)
Revenue :max
a ∑i∈N ∑Ck∈C
wCki a
Ck
i (4)
Number of Winners :max
a ∑i∈N
Yi (5)
Spectrum Utilization :max
a ∑i∈N ∑Ck∈C
aCki (6)
Subject to, ∑
j∈N(i)∪i
aCki ≤ 1
ECki a
Ck
i = a
Ck
i , ∀i ∈ N,∀k ∈ C
0≤ aCki ≤ 1
where,
Yi = 0 if ∑
Ck∈C
aCki = 0
Yi = 1 if ∑
Ck∈C
aCki > 0
Results shown for optimal solution are obtained by solving the
LP using the GUROBI solver.
Social Welfare: The social welfare achieved in the market for
different auction schemes are compared against the optimal solu-
tion in Fig 6(a). As the demand in the market increases, the social
welfare in the market also increases, as more bidders’ demands get
satisfied. The superior performance of GAVEL observed with re-
spect to AEGIS-MP and SMASHER-GR can be attributed to two
main factors. First, GAVEL does not limit any channel assign-
ment opportunities in order to retain the strategy-proof nature of the
scheme. Second, the use of fine-grained channels enables GAVEL
to satisfy a significantly larger number of bidders’ demand when
compared to AEGIS-MP. When compared to the optimal solution,
the social welfare achieved in GAVEL is lower primarily due to the
lack of complete information of channel demands in the market at
each bidder.
It is worth noting that maximization of overall social welfare is
not an objective in GAVEL. The consideration of a local neigh-
borhood in the conflict graph for a channel is necessary to enable
truthful bidding. However this does not always maximize social
welfare. To illustrate this, consider the conflict graph shown in Fig.
5. A channel exclusively assigned to bidder C would be unavail-
able to bidders A, B, and D. In GAVEL, bidder C will be assigned
the channel if it is the highest bidder, even though it may lower
the overall social welfare. Despite this, GAVEL achieves social
welfare closer to the optimal when compared to AEGIS-MP and
SMASHER-GR for reasons discussed above.
Revenue: The revenue generated in the market with varying de-
mand is shown in Fig.6(b). It can be seen GAVEL achieves higher
revenue than the other two schemes because of two reasons. First,
the ability to allocate fine-grained channels increases competition
in the network, thereby increasing the total revenue generated. While
SMASHER-GR also supports fine-grained channels it only allows
uniform valuation for channel bundles which results in significant
loss of revenue. Second, unlike the other auction schemes, GAVEL
does not group bidders into groups to identify and charge a criti-
cal price from the winning bidders. Instead, each winning bidder
pays the exact opportunity cost in the network for his access to the
channel.
Spectrum Utilization: The percentage of spectrum utilized with
varying demand in the market is shown in Fig.6(c). The optimal
solution shows the amount of possible spectrum utilization in the
scenario. As demand in the market increases, spectrum utilization
also increases. When there is about 60% demand in the network,
the spectrum utilization achieved is more than 90% for all the auc-
tion mechanisms. This is due to the limited number of channels
in the market. Also considering that it over allocates channels to
bidders who may not end up using these channels, the effective
spectrum utilization should be even lower.
Percentage of Winners: Fig.6(d), shows the percentage of win-
ners in the auction. The optimal scheme shows the maximum num-
ber of winners possible in this scenario. It can be seen that for the
auction mechanisms as the demand in the market increases, there
is a lower number of winners, due to the increase in competition.
Unlike the auction schemes, the optimal solution is able to generate
more winners with increasing demand as it increases the opportu-
nity for a bidder to win. GAVEL has a significant increase in the
percentage of winners (20% better) when compared to AEGIS-MP
due to the use of fine-grained channels. Without the ability to al-
locate fine-grained channels, only one bidder can win the channel
in a neighborhood. On the other hand, SMASHER-GR has a high
percentage of winners since it uses a greedy scheme to allocate
channels and support fine-grained channels. However even with a
high number of winners SMASHER-GR achieves a lower social
welfare and revenue due to the simplicity of the supported valua-
tions, where all the channel bundles a bidder desires has the same
valuation.
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Figure 7: Revenue and Number of Rounds vs Price Increment
Step Size
Round Price Increment: Unlike sealed bid auction schemes, GAVEL
is an iterative mechanism that spans several rounds. The number of
rounds is determined by the step size of the price increment in each
round. To analyze the effect of this price increment, we fix the
demand in the market to 60% to compute revenue and number of
rounds for different price increment values shown in Fig.7. The
highest revenue is obtained with the smallest step size while the
auction takes most number of rounds to complete. Increasing the
step size decreases the revenue because a higher step size drives out
demand quickly and gets the auction to a point when effectively all
the bidders have zero demand even though there are still unallo-
cated channels, explaining the drop in revenue. Clearly, a higher
step size leads to auction completing in fewer rounds. Interesting
point to note is about how reduction in revenue with increasing step
size relates to the reduction in number of rounds. It can be seen
from Fig.7 that increasing the step size from 1 to 5 results in about
15% loss of revenue but reduces the number of rounds by about
70%, suggesting a value for step size that keeps the duration and
overhead of auction minimal without hurting the revenue much.
To summarize, GAVEL generates higher revenues for the incum-
bents by enabling fine-grained channels while efficiently using op-
portunities for channel reuse. This is an incentive for the incum-
bents to share more spectrum in the market, which can in turn ben-
efit bidders. GAVEL achieves higher social welfare which means
a higher number of bidders are satisfied, while protecting the bid
privacy from the auctioneer. This is an incentive for the bidders to
participate in the auction leading to more competition and efficient
use of the wireless spectrum.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered use of short-term spectrum
auctions for the emerging dynamic LSA regulatory framework. From
this perspective, we have examined the limitations of existing auc-
tion schemes and observe that they can be attributed to the behav-
ior of the underlying auction format used (the sealed-bid auction)
in almost all existing schemes. Our key insight is that the alterna-
tive ascending bid auction format, while theoretically equivalent to
a sealed-bid auction, has different behavioral properties that natu-
rally offer freedom from the limitations of existing sealed bid based
auction schemes.
Leveraging the aforementioned insight, we have proposed GAVEL,
a short-term spectrum auction scheme based on the ascending bid
auction format. GAVEL is well suited for the dynamic LSA con-
text in that it supports heterogeneous spectrum, fine-grained chan-
nels and has a rich bidding language that enables bidders to obtain
the right combination of substitute and complementary channels.
We prove that GAVEL is strategy-proof, economically robust, pri-
vacy preserving and protects against false-name bids. Via extensive
simulations, GAVEL is shown to achieve higher social welfare and
revenue than two recently proposed auction schemes while being
close to the optimal solution (obtained from a LP formulation) in
terms of social welfare, revenue, number of winning bidders and
spectrum utilization.
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